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Anti-corruption disclosures reflect the company's commitment to 
prevent and combat corruption. This study examines the impact of 
managerial ownership, block holder ownership, government 
ownership, diversification, board independence, the board of 
commissioners' size, and diversification on anti-corruption disclosures. 
The object of this research is IDX listed companies from 2013 to 2017. 
Data obtained from the company's annual report  Data analysis is 
multiple linear regression. The results showed that the managerial 
ownership, government ownership, board independence, and board 
size positively affected anti-corruption disclosures, block holders 
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ABSTRAK 
Pengungkapan anti-korupsi menunjukkan komitmen perusahaan untuk 
mencegah dan memberantas korupsi. Penelitian ini menguji dampak 
kepemilikan manajerial, kepemilikan pemegang blok, kepemilikan pemerintah, 
diversifikasi, independensi dewan komisaris, dan ukuran dewan komisaris 
terhadap pengungkapan anti korupsi. Objek penelitian ini adalah perusahaan 
yang terdaftar di Bursa Efek Indonesia tahun 2013 -2017. Data diperoleh dari 
laporan tahunan perusahaan  Analisis data yang digunakan adalah regresi 
linier berganda. Hasil penelitian menunjukkan bahwa struktur kepemilikan 
manajerial, struktur kepemilikan pemerintah, independensi dewan komisaris 
dan ukuran dewan komisaris berpengaruh positif terhadap pengungkapan anti 
korupsi, sedangkan struktur kepemilikan blockholder berpengaruh negatif dan 
diversifikasi berpengaruh positif pada pengungkapan anti korupsi. 
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The anti-corruption disclosure refers to the company efforts in corruption 
prevention, and it signifies a company's responsibility to address this form of 
dishonesty in business practices. The Circular Letter of the Indonesian Financial 
Services Authority no. 32/SEOJK.04/2015 recommends that every company should 
possess anti-corruption and anti-fraud policies. However, this recommendation is half-
heartedly implemented, and it is proved by the poor performance of anti-corruption 
disclosures of Indonesian companies (Joseph et al., 2016) and (Sari, Cahaya, & Joseph, 
2020). Anti-corruption disclosures aim to ensure company managers' accountability to 
the public (De Melo & Patten, 2015). An important aspect, anti-corruption disclosure 
demonstrates a company's commitment to preventing, monitoring, and eradicating 
corruption (Healy & Serafeim, 2016).  
Using companies participating in Malaysia and Indonesia Sustainability 
Reporting Award, Joseph et al. (2016) prove that disclosing anti-corruption practices in 
both countries is still low.  Unlike Joseph et al. (2016), whose research attempts to 
determine the extent of anti-corruption information disclosure, this study aims to 
prove the impact of ownership structure, board of commissioners, and diversification 
on anti-corruption disclosures the Indonesian Stock Exchange listed-companies during 
2013-2017.  The Period of 2013-2017 was used to highlight the impact of the Indonesian 
Financial Services Authority recommendation on anti-corruption and anti-fraud 
policies disclosure in Indonesian listed company annual report.   
Some previous researches examine various factors, for instances, good corporate 
governance and fundamental conditions of company, which encourage companies to 
engage in the disclosures of anti-corruption policies (Healy & Serafeim, 2016; Tirtasari 
& Hartomo, 2019; Hartomo & Silvia, 2019  and Sari et al., 2020).  However, this study 
examines the impact of ownership structure, board of directors, and company 
diversification on anti-corruption disclosure in Indonesia.  The ownership structure 
covers managerial ownership, government ownership, and block holder ownership, 
while the board of directors refers to the board's independence and number. 
Managerial ownership plays a role in harmonizing the management's interests 
and other stockholders (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Sepasi, Kazempour, & 
Mansourlakoraj (2016) investigate the relationship between ownership structure and 
disclosure quality and prove that managerial ownership harms disclosure quality. 
Enough control mechanisms and supervision should be established to reduce the 
contrast between the managers and the firm's owners. One of these mechanisms is firm 
domination. If the mechanisms of firm domination work well, they will reduce 
opportunistic and jobbery behavior of the manager, which can increase the quality of 
disclosure. 
High levels of block holding ownership mean that a few numbers of people only 
control stocks, and as a result, concentrated ownership occurs.  A high level of block 
holder ownership has more power to demand managers to be more transparent 
because block holders want to know whether their funds are appropriately managed 
(Edmans, 2014). The structure of block holder ownership will strengthen company 
supervision and transparency, reflecting the higher level of anti-corruption disclosure 
policy.  
Government stock ownership causes a company to operate in harmony to meet 
the interests of the government. The company will comply with procedures and rules 
concerned with corruption preventions. Consequently, this type of ownership allows 
disclosures that are completeness. Sepasi et al. (2016) claim a positive correlation 
between government ownership structure and anti-corruption disclosures. (Sari et al., 
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2020) state that government ownership is not a significant predictor of anti-corruption 
disclosures. Thus, the governments do not have sufficient time and 'energy' to 
coercively push companies to disclose anti-corruption activities (Sari et al., 2020). This 
research aims to reexamine this condition in the Indonesian context. 
A more diversified company, the more complicated business operation and will 
face more severe challenges in fighting corruption. An opportunistic manager who 
mainly works to serve his interests is most likely to conceal unlawful actions, including 
corruption, in his company. In this type of company, it is challenging to detect 
corruption practices due to its more complex business activities (Healy & Serafeim, 
2016). A manager in such a company has more room to be dishonest and tries his best 
to cover his company's wrongdoings from external parties. Diversified companies are 
then expected to be more engaged and transparent in revealing anti-corruption 
policies. 
Independent commissioners' presence will reduce vested interests and pressures 
on the company, and this condition enables a director to make accountable and 
transparent decisions. Independent commissioners play a role in increasing 
transparency on corporate information reporting. This condition allows the company 
to share more information to investors, including the information on anti-corruption 
disclosures. Tirtasari & Hartomo (2019) and Healy & Serafeim (2016) prove a positive 
impact of board of commissioners independence on anti-corruption disclosures. 
The number of board of commissioners determines the quality of supervision in a 
company. More commissioners mean proper supervision can be carried out. Proper 
supervisions enable a company to be more transparent in delivering corporate 
information (Kamwana & Ombati, 2018), and one possible information to share is the 
anti-corruption policies. In her research (Maharesti, 2018), the board of commissioner 
independence positively impacts the company's social disclosures. The disclosure of 
anti-corruption practices is an example of a company's social disclosures.   
This study examines the impact of factors determining anti-corruption disclosure 
in an Indonesian listed company. We examine the ownership structure factors, board 
of directors factors, and diversification on anti-corruption disclosure. Ownership 
structure factors refer to managerial ownership, block holder ownership, and 
government ownership. Meanwhile, the board of director factors refers to board 
independence and the board of commissioners' size. 
 
METHOD 
The populations of this research are the IDX listed companies during 2013-2017. 
The samples are the IDX listed companies issuing annual reports, especially the ones 
meeting the following criteria: their annual reports there are accessible, their financial 
statements are reported in the Indonesian Rupiah, and they provide complete data to 
become research samples. The sampling technique uses purposive sampling, which 
determines samples based on specific criteria—the final sample results obtained by 
1864 companies with an explanation, as shown in Table 1. 
The dependent variable of this research is the disclosure of anti-corruption 
policies. The variable is measured using the (Dissanayake, Islam, & Dellaportas, 2012)’s 
anti-corruption index.  The Dissanayake et al. (2012) measure was employed because it 
was comprehensively developed through a detailed analysis of several International 
Governmental Organizations guidelines for anti-bribery movement: United Nations, 
World Bank, Transparency International, and World Economic Forum (Joseph et al., 
2016). 
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Table 1. Sample Selection  
No Explanation 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Total 
1. IDX Listed Companies in 2013-2017 433 456 465 465 491 2355 
2. Inaccessible information (31) (30) (32) (18) (19) (130) 
3. Financial statements in the 
Indonesian Rupiah 
(67) (62) (71) (69) (67) (336) 
4. Incomplete research data 
 
(7) (7) (5) (3) (3) (25) 
 Total Sample 328 357 357 401 421 1864 
 
This research's independent variables are managerial ownership, block holder 
ownership, government ownership, the diversification of subsidiaries, the board of 
commissioners' independence and size, and the board size.  
The managerial ownership is the stock proportion commonly owned by the 
board of directors and commissioners. The structure of block holder ownership is the 
stockholders' stock proportion, and it comprises 5% or more of ownership. The 
government ownership structure is measured with a dummy variable: the value is 0 if 
the government owns stock proportion, while the value is one if the government does 
not. The diversification variable is also measured with a dummy variable. The value is 
0 if the holding and subsidiary companies operate in the same business segment, while 
the value is one if both operate in different segments. The board of commissioners' 
independence refers to the number of independent board of commissioners after they 
are divided by the total number of commissioners. At the same time, the board of 
commissioners' number of the board commissioners in a company. This study uses 
Multiple Linear Regression to analyze the available research data. 
 
RESULT AND DISCUSSION 
As many as 1864 preliminary data are used in this study. By using the Normality 
Test, the number of preliminary data is then narrowed down to 904 final samples 
(Table 2). 
Table  2. The Results of Descriptive Statistics  
 N Minimum Maximum Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Managerial Ownership 904 0,00 89,44 5,7873 14,77061 
Blockholder Ownership 904 7,18 100,00 70,9947 17,24522 
Board of Commissioner Size 904 2,00 10,00 3,5962 1,44275 
Board of Commissioner 
Independence 
904 0,13 0,83 0,3986 0,10893 
Anti-corruption Disclosures 904 0,00 0,35 0,0514 0,04976 
Valid N (listwise) 904     
 
The Descriptive Statistics analysis shows that the level of anti-corruption policy 
disclosures in Indonesian companies is still deficient with an average score of 0,0514. 
The score shows an irony since the Indonesian Financial Service Authority (Otoritas 
Jasa Keuangan) has issued a Letter No. 32 / SEOJK.04 / 2015, stating that Indonesian 
companies are recommended to have anti-corruption and anti-fraud policies. 
Unfortunately, these recommendations are beyond implementation because it is 
considered to be voluntary and unbinding in nature.   
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Managerial ownership indicates a minimum value of 0.000 (ADES in year 2013) 
and a maximum value of 89.44 (BTON in year 2017).  The average value or mean value 
of the managerial ownership is 5.7873, and the deviation standard is 14.77061. The data 
show that the manager's percentage of shares is not strong enough to influence 
company decisions.  
The minimum value of block holder ownership is 7.18 (PLAS in the year 2017), 
and the maximum value is 100.00 (BRIS in the year 2017), while the average value is 
70.9947. However, there is a high average of block holder ownership, but still no rules 
governing block holders' ownership in an Indonesian company. 
The minimum value of the board of commissioners' size variable is 2.00 (APIC in 
year 2013), and the maximum value is 10.00 (AUTO in year 2013) with an average 
value of 3.5962 and the deviation standard, 1.44275. The average value implies that all 
samples have complied with the regulation of the Indonesian Financial Service 
Authority No. 33/POJK.04/2014 requiring every company to have at least two 
members of the commissioner board. 
The independent commissioner variable indicates a minimum value of 0,125 
(KMTR in year 2017) and a maximum value of 0.75 (BRIS in year2017) with an average 
value of 0.3985 and the deviation standard, 0.10860. It can be concluded that, on 
average, the number of independent commissioners of the sample companies is 
already following the Regulation of the Indonesian Financial Service Authority No. 33 
/POJK.04/2014, concerning the number of independent commissioners, should meet 
the minimum 30% of the total number of commissioners. 
 
Table 3. The Results of Frequency Statistics  
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative percent 
Government Ownership     
Valid 0 687 75,7 75,7 75,7 
Valid 1 217 24,3 24,3 100,0 
Total 904 100,0 100,0  
Diversification     
Valid 0 678 74,2 74,2 74,2 
Valid 1 226 25,8 25,8 100,0 
Total 904 100,0 100,0  
 
The frequency statistics (Table 3) show that the government ownership variable 
has 24,3 percent of the Indonesian government's total sample, and the Indonesian 
government does not own 75,7 percent. This data shows that majority of the sample is 
not a government-owned company. Regarding the diversification variable, frequency 
statistics show that 25,8 percent of parent companies have different subsidiary 
company segments and 74,2 percent of parent companies have the same subsidiary. 
This show that the majority of the sample are non-diversified company. 
 
The Impact of Managerial Ownership on Company’s Anti-corruption Disclosures 
The results in Table 4 indicate that managerial ownership positively impacts the 
anti-corruption disclosures in a company. Manager's stock ownership can reduce 
agency costs. That condition is possible because this kind of ownership plays a role in 
harmonizing the management's interests and other types of stockholders (Jensen & 
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Meckling, 1976). (Sepasi et al., 2016) provides empirical proof that the management's 
stock ownership level positively impacts the amount of information shared by a 
company in its annual report. The reason is that individuals act in harmony to achieve 
their personal goals, which helps their organization reach its own goals, as the Goal 
Congruence theory (Warfield, Wild, & Wild, 1995) also suggests. In line with this 
theory, the presence of common goals, for instance, to achieve the best results, between 
the managers and stockholders, will lead to the increase of transparencies, including 
disclosing anti-corruption policies (Tirtasari & Hartomo, 2019).  
This study proves a positive impact of managerial ownership on the scope of 
anti-corruption policy disclosures in a company.  This study strengthens the Agency 
Theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976), predicting a positive correlation between the 
managerial interests and the disclosures of financial statement information. Managerial 
interests also have a positive impact on the scope of anti-corruption disclosures in 
financial statements. That condition is possible because managerial ownership plays a 
significant role in harmonizing the management's interests and the stockholders' 
interests, but the managers. 
 
Table 4. Test Result  
Model Standardized Coefficients Beta t Sig. 
1 (Constant)  -4,384 ,000 
Managerial Ownership ,058 3,764 ,000 
Blockholder Ownership -,121 -7,828 ,000 
Government Ownership ,600 37,056 ,000 
Diversification ,094 6,142 ,000 
BC Size ,431 26,056 ,000 
BC Independence ,204 13,141 ,000 
 
The Impact of Blockholder Ownership on Company’s Anti-corruption Disclosures 
Structures of block holder ownership negatively impact on company's anti-
corruption disclosures. Blockholder ownership refers to investors' stocks commonly 
owned whose own position is significant for their common stocks. The high level of 
block holder ownership allows the block holders to demand their managers for 
transparencies. The demand makes sense because the block holders want to know 
whether their financial investment is appropriately managed (Sepasi et al., 2016). The 
argument is that because the block holder ownership structure tends to be centralized, 
other parties will find it difficult to challenge the block holers' interests or wishes. This 
situation gives higher chances of fraud.  
Centralized block holder ownership helps facilitate stockholders deciding on 
disclosing the company's anti-corruption policies (Sepasi et al., 2016). The lower the 
level of block holder ownership, the better chance for a company to engage in anti-
corruption policy disclosures. The vital role of block holders motivates them to pay for 
monitoring or monitoring the company's management performance (Edmans, 2014). 
When shareholders do not have a majority interest, it is less economical for individual 
shareholders to incur high monitoring costs because they will only receive a small 
benefit. This research finding, consistent with Al-bassam et al. (2018), shows an 
increase in block ownership significantly reduces disclosure. Al-bassam et al. (2018) 
state that block holder ownership can serve as a substitute for adequate governance 
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The Impact of Government Ownership on  Company’s Anti-Corruption Disclosures 
The structure of government ownership has a positive impact on the company's 
anti-corruption disclosures. The government’s stock ownership makes a company 
operate in harmony with the interests of the government.  A government company will 
comply with procedures or regulations concerning with anti-corruption measures. In 
such a condition, the government can monitor the company much better. Although 
inconsistent with (Sari et al., 2020). The result of this study is in line with a research 
carried out by Sepasi et al. (2016), Eng & Mak (2003), and Huafang & Jianguo (2007), 
who point out that the structure of government ownership has a positive impact on the 
disclosures of company information, including the ones related to anti-corruption 
policies. 
Indonesia government have commitments to combat corruption and articulate 
this commitment in their regulations. In this regulated condition, the governments 
potentially push companies to obey anti-corruption regulations and disclose their anti-
corruption actions. Government-owned companies themselves tend to be politically 
sensitive because their activities are more visible in front of the public eyes, and there is 
a higher expectation for them to be aware of their public duties (Muttakin & 
Subramaniam, 2015). 
 
The Impact of Diversification on Company’s Anti-corruption Disclosures 
Subsidiary diversification has a positive impact on the company's anti-corruption 
disclosures. One way to maintain and develop its business is by expanding business 
segments (Ataullah, Davidson, Le, & Wood, 2014). A diversified company will face 
asymmetric information, and as a result, it will share more information to overcome 
the asymmetric information (Healy & Serafeim, 2016). Another argument claims that 
subsidiary companies with different business segments will have more complicated 
business operations. This condition causes the subsidiary companies to be vulnerable 
to corruption.  
A company needs to disclose more information to prevent corruption. The more 
diversified a company is, the more information it contributes to anti-corruption 
disclosures. More anti-corruption disclosures will boost management transparency and 
reduce asymmetric information. The disclosure of anti-corruption policies manifests 
the diversified companies' management transparency, the type of companies 
characterized by more complex operations than those only focusing on primary 
competence.  
 
The Impact of the Board Independence on Company’s Anti-corruption Disclosures 
Board independence has a positive impact on the company's anti-corruption 
disclosures. The more a company has independent commissioners, the more 
opportunities the company has to engage in anti-corruption disclosures. An 
independent commissioners most likely to supply and disclose information to 
investors. The board of commissioners' independence is gained if the number of 
outside commissioners is higher than inside commissioners. When this happens, 
monitoring and supervising processes will be better executed because the company 
management’s chances to commit dishonest behaviors are limited (Healy & Serafeim, 
2016).  
The independent commissioners are more objective in perceiving corporate 
matters, and this condition encourages the company to disclose information, including 
providing relevant information for the company investors. This study supports the 
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result of Tirtasari & Hartomo (2019) and Healy & Serafeim (2016), who also highlight 
that the board of commissioners' role is to supervise management's decisions. The 
increasing number of independent commissioners will yield quality supervision, as 
portrayed in the increase of anti-corruption disclosures. 
 
The Impact of the Board of Commissioner Size on Company’s Anti-corruption 
Disclosures  
The size of the board of commissioners has a positive impact on the company's 
anti-corruption disclosures. The more significant number of commissioners a company 
has, the greater the commissioners' greater power to bring management pressure for 
company information disclosures and transparency (Kamwana & Ombati, 2018). In 
other words, the board's bigger size will cause monitoring processes to be more 
effective, which conditions the company to share company information. For a 
company, anti-corruption policies should be a part of voluntary disclosures that reflect 
its transparency. 
This study's result is in line with  Maharesti ( 2018), stating that the board of 
commissioners' size has a positive impact on a company's social disclosures, including 
the disclosures of anti-corruption policies. The more significant number of 
commissioners' board will increase commitment to anti-corruption policies, guiding 
and enhancing company compliance to business ethics principles. The more significant 
number of commissioners' board also provides active support for the implementation 
and compliance of business ethics policy, including anti-corruption activity. 
 
CONCLUSION 
This research concludes that the disclosure level of the anti-corruption 
Indonesian listed companies' anti-corruption policies in 2013-2017 is relatively low. It 
implies that Indonesian companies have made a little effort to prevent and combat 
corruption. It is true that the Indonesian Financial Services Authority (Otoritas Jasa 
Keuangan, 2015) in its Indonesian Corporate Governance Roadmap 2015 and Circular 
Letter No. 32/SEOJK.04/ recommend that Indonesian companies to have anti-
corruption and anti-fraud policies.  The reality is that this recommendation is not fully 
executed because many consider it as optional and non-binding.  
The managerial ownership, government ownerships, diversifications, the 
independence, and size of the board of commissioners have positive impacts on 
disclosing the company's anti-corruption policies, while the block holder ownership 
negatively impacts the company's anti-corruption disclosures. Conclusion This 
condition indicates that all factors suspected of affecting the disclosure of anti-
corruption policies are proven to impact the disclosure of anti-corruption policies 
significantly. 
This research's scope is only limited to the three factors impacting anti-corruption 
disclosures, namely, ownership structure, diversification, and board of commissioners. 
It means that this research has not covered the whole aspects of corporate governance 
and company characteristics.  Besides, it has not examined each group or industrial 
sector listed on the Indonesian Stock Exchange (IDX) to find out the impact of 
industrial factors on the disclosure of anti-corruption policies.  This research also 
excludes industrial sectors exposed to a high risk of corruption, such as mining, oil and 
gas, forestry, or construction. Future researchers can carry out a complete examination 
of the governance variables such as the governance committee's presence, the 
competence of the audit committee, and the company characteristic variables such as 
industrial risks, auditor quality, and company's financial conditions. 
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